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Abstract
This study examines various factors or characteristics (risk and non-risk) that determine
a firm’s credit risk premium, as measured by its credit default swap (CDS) spread, with
a particular focus on the impact of environment, social, and governance (ESG) scores.
The framework employed is a general equilibrium asset pricing model which integrates
classical and behavioral finance elements, known as popularity-based asset pricing. It
treats all attributes or characteristics of an asset as ”factors” to which investors assign a
degree of popularity, which changes over time. Non-risk characteristics are classified as
”tastes” or ”disagreements”, Fama French (2007). Firms’ degree of adherence to ESG practices is treated as one of these factors, looking at data over a decade period (2010-2021) of
US corporate credits. In the popularity-based framework, investors have divergent beliefs
about expected returns, and a variety of risk and non-risk preferences, such as liquidity or
ESG. The popularity of ESG awareness among investors is treated as a preference rather
than an economic risk factor exposure.
The main results from this analysis are that, for the entire universe of US corporate
credit market, both investment-grade and high-yield (sub-investment grade), the conclusion is that ESG, as a preference, is not significant in terms of the long-term credit risk
protection spread levels for the entire universe, as well as investment-grade credit, but
for sub-investment grade credits, that is not the case. These results indicate that a wellestablished and mature firm with a strong ESG consciousness and policy orientation may
attract ESG-conscious investors, and these investors may be willing to pay a premium
for the ESG benefits due to their popularity, leading to tighter CDS spreads or in other
words ESG disclosure is negatively related to the credit default swap spread, which suggests that firms with a higher ESG disclosure have lower default risk. These results are
essential for all firms’ stakeholders, and bondholders, to consider the firm’s ESG disclosure
in conjunction with the life cycle stage before making their investment decisions.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Perhaps one of the most significant controversies among financial economists is that between classical and behavioral finance. This thesis applies a framework that integrates
the two schools of thought. On the classical side, the key determinant of return is the
risk factor exposure; Fama and French (1992)[12] are probably most well-known among
practitioners, where risk factors are used as explanatory variable to help explain investment returns that are not well-explained by the market factor of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model or CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965, Treynor, 1962, and Mossin, 1966). While
the CAPM is literally the textbook equilibrium approach of the last 50 years and a key
element of every finance curriculum; numerous papers have been written on the CAPM’s
shortcomings (e.g., Basu, 1977; Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1994). Despite these shortcomings, the usage of Fama-French 3-factor model
and its various extensions is prevalent among practitioners; yet importantly, these multifactor models are not asset pricing models, rather, they are models for analyzing realized
returns. On the behavioral side, where asset pricing focuses on the way investor psychology can create gaps between the market prices of securities and their corresponding
fundamental values and incorporates the fact that heterogeneity is a fact of life, and people
are different in the way they form judgments. Whichever story you subscribe to, classical
or behavioral—and both could apply—the market is very complex. It contains far more
securities than can be practical to analyze individually. To reduce the units of analysis to
a manageable number, researchers and investment managers have compressed securities
and their attributes or characteristics into factors. The framework being introduced here
is the popularity-based pricing, which allows us to integrate the two schools of thought by
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helping investors to interpret that characteristics or factors associated with assets through
expressing their popularity.
Popularity is a phrase first coined by Roger Ibbotson and Thomas Idzorek in 2014 in
their article “Dimensions of Popularity.” They describe it as another word for demand,
and that different securities contain more favorable characteristics toward investors. This
is a relatively new financial theory, and many have come before it. However, the idea that
the popularity of an asset affects its pricing, and ultimately its return is not new but is
often overlooked in the mathematics of asset pricing models. It is important not to think
of popularity as a factor in itself, but as a framework for understanding and predicting
factors. Investors regard these factors or characteristics as positive or negative costs, and
evaluate expected returns net of these costs. The popularity-based pricing framework applies to all assets—including stocks and bonds, real estate, venture capital, durables, and
intangibles such as human capital—and incorporates all asset characteristics.

In this thesis, the corporate bond is the asset of interest here. According to the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the bond market is large, with
more than $15 trillion outstanding in the USA alone at the end of the last quarter of
2021. As such, what drives corporate bond prices and returns is an essential question.
Many factors drive corporate bond prices, but its credit risk dominates it. However, this
risk can be isolated and traded separately as a credit default swap. The popularity-based
framework is used to examine whether the popularity of ESG impacts the prices of the
credit risk in the form of CDS spreads.

1.1

Introducing popularity-based pricing - PAPM

The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed over half century ago. Despite
the distinction of the theory, subsequent empirical research has mostly failed to confirm it.
Perhaps its biggest strength, expressing investor preferences solely in terms of risk, is its
limitation. Because in practice, investors care about many characteristics that have little
to do with risk. These include liquidity, taxability, scalability, divisibility, controllability,
transparency, and the components of sustainability, namely environmental, social, and
governance factors. Including these characteristics may even be the way to resurrect the
CAPM.
12

This section of the thesis addresses non-risk characteristics in a CAPM like framework
based on the concept of popularity introduced by Ibbotson and Idzorek (2014)[?] with
an equilibrium model is referred to as the Popularity Asset Pricing Model, or PAPM for
short.
Motivated in part by the shortcomings of the CAPM, in an academic article that is not
well-known amongst practitioners called “Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Prices,” Fama
and Fench (2007)[11] identifies ‘disagreement’ and ‘tastes’ as two key ingredients missing
from the CAPM that should impact asset prices. Disagreement refers to heterogeneous
expectations. Tastes refer to investor preferences beyond risk-tolerance. Even though
Fama and French (2007) (hence force “FF”) identifies two important ways to make the
CAPM more realistic, FF stopped short of developing an equilibrium asset pricing model
that incorporates these improvements. The Popularity Asset Pricing Model or PAPM adds
to the literature by incorporating both disagreement and tastes into a intuitive, equilibrium
asset pricing model that is a generalized less restrictive version of the practitioner friendly
CAPM. Disagreement and especially tastes are directly related to environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) investing, which has spawned a variety of recent papers that put
forth specialty asset pricing models that incorporate ESG, such as Baker et al. (2020),
Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020), Pedersen, Fitzgibbon, and Pomorski (2020), and
Zerbib (2020). Of course investors care about a variety of characteristics beyond ESG, such
as liquidity, income returns, taxes, faith-based values, etc. The PAPM is the generalized
asset pricing model that encompasses the CAPM and these new ESG-specific models,
allowing for any number of asset characteristics and a wide range of investors with different
expectations and tastes. The CAPM and the FF-inspired PAPM are equilibrium asset
pricing models in which prices are determined partly by investor preferences or demand
for various security characteristics. In contrast, Ross’s Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT)
(1976) posits that the economy supplies returns in a multi-factor linear structure. Since
these risk factors are systematic, arbitrage does not eliminate them, and each factor is
priced in an isolated long/short portfolio. The APT provides no theory of the factors,
leaving it to empiricists to identify the factor structure that the economy provides. The
PAPM and the APT result in a linear structure of expected returns. However, the PAPM
helps identify the linear structure since we start with some idea as to what characteristics
investors in aggregate like (liquidity, ESG, brands, etc.) or dislike (market risk, negative
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asymmetry, etc.). Importantly, unlike the APT factors, the PAPM characteristics do not
have to be risk related, just liked or disliked by enough investors. Furthermore, in the
PAPM equilibrium, preferences are aggregated across all investors, and mispricing can and
likely does occur as investor expectations (who disagree) are also aggregated.
Popularity builds on classical finance and the NET, stating that investors prefer lower
risk and frictional costs for their assets. It also includes aspects of behavioral finance, such
as different characteristics and anomalies that investors prefer and are therefore Popular.
For example, while risk is Unpopular, liquidity is Popular (Ibbotson and Idzorek 2014).
Popularity can also help explain temporary market mispricings. The general thesis of this
model is that the less Popular a security is (based on these characteristics/anomalies), the
lower the expected price, resulting in a higher expected return
While PAPM is theoretical in nature just like the CAPM, there are number of practical takeaways that practitioners will find helpful and intuitive when thinking about both
asset prices and portfolio construction. First, all practitioners intuitively know that the
market is not perfectly efficient (even if the market is hard to beat). With the PAPM,
both disagreement and tastes individually and collectively lead to asset prices that differ
from those of the CAPM; thus, the market is not efficient. If the market is not perfectly
efficient, portfolio construction is more complicated than simply levering / delivering the
market portfolio. In fact, portfolio construction under the CAPM and PAPM are very
different. With the CAPM everyone should hold a portion of their wealth in the same
market portfolio and portfolio optimization is unnecessary, while with the PAPM, portfolio optimization is necessary with investors arriving at personalized portfolios. In terms
of thinking about asset prices, if enough investors simultaneously like or dislike a given
characteristics, it will impact asset prices. More specifically, investments with liked characteristics are in high demand (popular) and thus more expensive, with lower expected
returns. Conversely, investment with disliked characteristic are in low demand (unpopular) and thus less expensive, with higher expected returns. Finally, if aggregate tastes are
changing, such as more investors are seeking investments with good ESG characteristics,
changes in aggregate tastes can cause investments with liked characteristics to temporarily
have better returns during periods of changing tastes.
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Table 1.1: Potential Explanations of Premiums and Anomalies

Characteristic

Investor Preference

Yield

Higher is liked.

Credit Quality

Higher is liked.

Duration

Depends. (LDI investors
love duration ).

Liquidity

Higher is liked.

Marketability/
Divisibility

Higher divisibility
is liked.

Nominal vs. Real
Inflation Protection)

Investors like
inflation protection.

Callable
Issuer Brand /
Reputation
Issuer ESG Score
Currency

Investors dislike
callability
Investors like issues
with a good brand/
reputation
Investor like stronger
ESG issuers.
Home Country.

Popularity Prediction
High yield;
higher price.
High credit quality;
higher price.
Mixed predictions.
High liquidity;
higher price.
Higher divisibility;
higher price.
High inflation
protection;
higher price.
Callable; lower price
Better Brand /
Reputation;
higher price.
Better ESGness;
higher price.

Pecuniary /
Non-Pecuniary
Pecuniary
Pecuniary
Pecuniary
Either
Pecuniary
Pecuniary
Pecuniary
Pecuniary
Either

source: EOY

Table 1.1 lists various premiums, anomalies, and characteristics that have been empirically related to security returns and attempts to associate them primarily with disagreement are likely to be temporary, given that misinformed investors should eventually learn.
Although the PAPM offers an explanation for the anomalies listed in Table 1 (while the
CAPM does not), the CAPM and PAPM are not at odds with one another. Rather, the
PAPM expands and generalizes the CAPM as well as recent ESG asset pricing models.
More specifically, the CAPM assumes that only risk is unpopular, and ignores all other
security characteristics, while many of the ESG models allow for just a single ESG characteristic. In the PAPM, multiple characteristics can have a price premium (or discount),
as long as the characteristics are generally popular (or unpopular).

1.2

Theoretical Determinants of Credit Spreads

The spread of a CDS is the annual amount which the protection buyer must pay the
protection seller over the length of the contract, expressed as a percentage of the notional
amount. CDS spreads and the probability of default of the reference entity are connected
by a relation of direct proportion. Greater is the probability of default of the issuer
and therefore, the probability of a credit event agreed in contractual session, higher is
the premium the protection seller will request to accept the credit risk. Therefore, on
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first approximation, CDS prices reflect the expectations of the default probability of the
reference entity; in other words, it can be assumed that CDS prices are equal to the
implied risk-neutral probability of default(PD) with a given recovery rate (RR), and S is
the flat CDS spread. A common way to model the default probability is by the hazard
rate (default intensity).From Hull1 , section 23.4 which the author defines λ, the default
intensity as,

λ(t) =

S(t)
1 − RR

(1.1)

This associated with the default probability by

P D(t, t + h) = λ(t)h + o(h)

(1.2)

with PD(t, t+h) the probability of a default occurring between t and t+h. Therefore:
Z

T

Z

T

(1 − P D(0, T ))P (t, t + dt) =

P D(0, T ) =
0

λ(t)(1 − P D(0, T ))dt

(1.3)

0

where the first term of the integral is ”default has not occurred so far” and the second
is ”default occurs on the next time step”. This means that P satisfies:
dP D(0, t)
= λ(t)(1 − P D(0, t))
dt

(1.4)

If the CDS spread is assumed to be constant, then λ is constant and a solution would be:


P D(0, t) = 1 − exp

−St
1 − RR


(1.5)

Equivalently solution for the CDS is:

S=

RR − 1
log(1 − P D(0, t))
t

(1.6)

CDS prices also include an element connected to the credit risk premium, namely the
compensation paid to investors for enduring exposure to default risk. Spread is therefore
technically the compensation for the expected loss, adjusted to reflect a proportion of
1

Option Futures and Other Derivatives
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the price of the default risk. This price may be interpreted as compensation per unit of
expected loss, and it is an indicator of default risk aversion for investors. It is worthwhile
noting that this compensation is a premium for the default risk aversion without any
mention of non-risk premium. This premium is a subjective factor related to the level of
risk aversion among the investors and factors related to the volatility level of variables
in the market, which may affect the probability of default. The risk premium may vary
over time, since it can change the risk aversion of the participants, who will request, for
the same risk loss, a higher risk premium. In theory, there are two distinct types of
default risk which may require a premium. The CDS spread of prices reflect many factors,
including the expected probability of default, the recovery rate in case of default, and the
risk premium for the volatility of the factors describing the probability of default.
Furthermore, CDS spreads reflect the market participants’ view of both probability of
default and an assumption about the recovery - what the defaulted debt would be worth
after the default. The recovery assumption grows more important as the CDS spread
widens, and the perceived probability of default increases. CDS spread is not the same as
probability of default because one also needs a recovery assumption to convert between
CDS spread and probability of default.
There are two different approaches on risk credit have been identified in the literature:
the reduced-form models2 and the structural approach models3 . The reduced-form models
or intensity-based models are a relatively recent approach to credit risk. The paper focuses
on the structural approach models, specifically Merton(1974)[16]. The regression variables
of the proposed model use the major inputs of the Merton(1974)[16] model framework and
focus on the following firm-specific variables for the regression; Stock return, Volatility
(stock volatility), Leverage, and Liquidity ( or a proxy). The eventual regression model
would then introduce market factors such as Spot rate, Term-structure slope, Market
condition, Market volatility (VIX). See Chapter 3 for more details.

1.3

Theoretical Model Proposed

There are numerous studies aimed at analyzing credit spreads determinants, including
ESG as a factor. Barth et al. (2019)[3] examine the determinants of CDS spreads and the
2

The reduced-form models or intensity-based model are originally introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull(1992)[15]

3

Structural models originated with Black and Scholes (1973)[4], Merton(1974)[16]
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impact of incorporating ESG scores. Zhang et al. (2005)[17] examine the determinants of
CDS spreads. They are concentrated on the effects of the volatility in firms value and of
the jump-to-default risk using variables such as ROE, leverage, dividend payout ratio or
macro-financial variables, such as the inclination of the yield curve, etc. Avramov et al.
(2007) analyzes the ability of the structural models to explain the variations in the credit
risk using a set of common factors and company-level fundamentals. In particular, the
variables used are interest rate, inclination of the rate curve, stock market yield, leverage
and the related volatilities. In this paper, the objective is to adopt a similar model to
account for the risk factors that mostly impact the CDS spreads; the residuals would then
be treated as the non-risk factor(s), or the behavioral components (preference or taste) as
the premium, either positively or negatively.
In this framework, CDS spread is the major contributor of CDS returns. And there
are many factors other than default probabilities, in addition to this this major risk factor,
and among others, this paper treats ESG as a non risk factor which investor can express
like or dislike . This expression is not systematic in nature.
I use a linear regression version of the PAPM in this paper. The characteristics that
get priced must have a rationale, i.e., they are either systematically liked or disliked.
The PAPM is an equilibrium model reflecting the underlying preferences of the market.
The derivation of the PAPM framework can be found in Popularity: A Bridge Between
Classical and Behavioral Research. CFA Institute Research Foundation.[[14]] . Since we
already have a good idea of what investors like or dislike in the bond market, I can use the
PAPM to test the various drivers of spreads and returns. The PAPM is a multifactor linear
asset pricing formula in which an asset’s expected return is related to various exposures
to various dimensions of popularity. A regression formulation for the PAPM is shown

Expected Return

jt

= RiskFreeRate t +

n
X

βjk Premium

jt

(1.7)

k

where RiskFreeRate is the term structure of interest rate over time (Treasure Yield
Curve), and j is each of the securities in a pool (in this paper, I have 209 CDS contracts),
and k is each n characteristic of the securities of interest by which the investor can express
a preference.
As long as the factor set is complete, this equation holds true for all assets.Since the
excess returns on securities can be expected to be proportional to the excess returns on
18

the factors, the risk on securities is also linked to the risk on the factors.
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Chapter 2

Literature Review and
Contribution
2.1

Introduction

In the classical finance paradigm, the tenet is how much an investor is willing to pay for an
asset with the knowledge of the asset’s perceived risk. The relationship between risk and
the expected return has always been the crux of finance. Historically, many academics have
endeavored to find the exact and comprehensive relationship. However, recent literature,
Mehra and Prescott (2008), have demonstrated that an asset has many attributes that go
into its pricing, including non-risk attributes (e.g., taste, preferences, disagreement). Here
we, advance this work by integrating the classical and behavioral finance when it comes to
pricing an asset; using the popularity framework which subsumes the idea of only considering risks as the key elements of pricing, and including preferences, taste, disagreement
(whether they are rational or irrational). In “Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Prices” FF
(2007)[11],argue that the assumptions of standard asset pricing models, such as CAPM,
are unrealistic and that both ’disagreement’ and ’tastes’ affect asset pricing. FF did not
present a formal model of how disagreement and tastes impact asset prices; that paper
discusses certain elements that would go into such a model and why those elements would
move prices away from what the CAPM suggested. The other shortcoming of the CAPM
identified by FF is ”tastes,” referring to the notion that investors have preferences beyond
risk tolerance. The major contribution of this paper is to apply the concepts adopted
for equities to that of corporate credit, given their capital structure; thought the element
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of preferences are entirely different.My paper contributes to the literature fundamentally
in these areas. First, as I addressed earlier; I implemented the Ibbotson and Idzorek
framework on a universe of 201 corporate credit using their CDS spreads. To the best
of my knowledge, this is novel. Second, we find empirical results that indicate investors
preferences do impact the excess return for corporate bonds via their CDS spreads.
As explained and demonstrated with the PAPM put forth by Idzorek, Kaplan, and
Ibbotson (2020)[?], both disagreement and tastes can be incorporated into a general equilibrium asset pricing model. In the PAPM, investors have heterogeneous expectations
(disagreements) about expected security returns and various risk and non-risk preferences
(tastes), such as tastes for ESG; thus, the PAPM takes two significant steps toward asset
pricing in the real world. The PAPM is a generalization of the CAPM, framed around
the two key ingredients that FF identifies as impacting asset prices – disagreement and
preferences/tastes. The PAPM builds on the New Equilibrium Theory of Ibbotson, Diermeier, and Siegel (1984), the popularity framework of Ibbotson and Idzorek (2014) and
Idzorek and Ibbotson (2017), and the empirical evidence and formal PAPM, with homogeneous expectations developed in the CFA Institute Research Foundation publication,
Popularity: A Bridge Between Classical and Behavioral Finance, by Ibbotson, Idzorek,
Kaplan, and Xiong (2018). The CAPM is the textbook approach and a vital element of
every finance curriculum; yet, in addition to FF, numerous papers have been written on
the CAPM’s shortcomings (e.g., Basu 1977; Banz, 1981; FF, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1994). In addition to being an asset pricing model, the CAPM also provides
specific guidance on portfolio construction – each investor should hold a levered or delevered position in the market portfolio, depending on their risk tolerance. The PAPM
also provides a specific method of portfolio construction based upon Markowitz’s (1952,
1958) mean-variance optimization, enabling personalized-preference-based portfolio construction. The majority of the body of work that has been produced to decipher the effect
of ESG factors (scores) on asset premium has been done with factor construction, as did
FF. Lioui and Tarelli (2021) found no evidence of factor premium associated with ESG
factors. The authors proposed a factor construction methodology controlling for both ESG
ratings and other firm characteristics. The methodology makes it possible to build pure
ESG factors that are directly comparable across data vendors and different pillars of ESG
ratings (ESG, E, S, and G). The alpha they filtered from realized returns is negatively re-
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lated to an ESG sentiment variable based on media attention, while it is positively related
to unexpected sentiment variations. Their findings confirmed many of the empirical literature that the evidence of premium is at best mixed. The Sharpe-Lintner-Treynor-Mossin
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed over 50 years ago. The prevailing
assumption of the CAPM is that markets act rationally so that only undiversifiable risk
is compensated with a risk premium. Efficient Capital Market Theory extends the use
of the rationality assumption, leading to prices being ”fair.” Therefore, market participants are not expected to ”beat the market” after adjusting for market risk. The CAPM
application can be reduced to a simple formula that predicts an asset’s expected return
as equal to the risk-free rate of return plus the beta of the asset relative to the market
multiplied by a single market premium for market risk. Other risk premiums have been
identified (e.g., a size premium, a credit risk premium, etc.), which led researchers to posit
various multi-dimensional risk-based asset pricing models, most notably the Ross (1976)
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). Not long after the development of the CAPM and Efficient Market Theory, psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) began to question the
basic assumption of rationality. Behavioral finance has offered up a plethora of behavioral biases that lead to irrational behavior, many of which seem to provide explanations
for some of the documented systematic departures in observed security prices relative to
those expected from the CAPM. While rich, thus far, behavioral finance has not provided
a complete framework or theory for understanding asset prices. The CAPM and its multifactor extensions remain the baseline asset pricing models compared to all other asset
pricing models. All of this leaves us with a need for a simple, coherent, and intuitive
asset pricing theory for understanding and forecasting asset prices. I believe this starts
with the concept of popularity. The popularity as an attribute of an asset would influence
the asset price; in the case of this study, the credit spread of a corporate debt via CDS
spreads. After accounting for liquidity, measured as bid/offer spread, and default probability, this study explores the relationship between a firm’s ESG score and residual credit
spread by treating ESG scores as a non-risk attribute of the asset. There have been many
recent studies of this relationship, but the focus has been on the risk component, looking
for the risk premium associate with ESG factors. Given the recent attention of regulators, policymakers, and asset managers to ESG factors, a plethora body of work has been
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conducted in this space1 , varying in consensus, especially in the ratings or scorings. The
divergence in the ESG rankings or scores can have far-reaching implications on investment
allocations, policy to ESG research. Many ESG researchers use these ESG data sets, and
their conclusions can vary quite starkly depending on which data provider they use, as
illustrated by Berg, Kölbel, and Rigobon(2020), in their research ”Aggregate Confusion”,
the authors were able to show that there is tremendous divergence in the ESG rankings
by looking at the correlation among these providers of ESG scores; on average, 0.61; by
comparison, credit ratings from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are correlated at 0.99 on
average. That means ”the information the decision-makers receive from [ESG] providers
are relatively noisy,” the paper states. In terms of whether the ESG factor has a premium
associated with it, Lioui and Tarelli (2021), in their research ”Chasing the ESG Factor,”
concluded that there is no ESG factor premium associated with it. I add to the literature
by answering whether ESG scores affect market price (i.e. ESG scores have become more
popular and now therefore have a greater effect credit risk).

2.2

ESG and Fixed income Corporate Credit Markets

A wide range of academic research and practitioner literature exists on the relationship
between ESG indicators and risk and performance analysis for equity markets, providing limited scope for the fixed-income markets.

At the asset level, the majority of

the existing literature on ESG factors and fixed income markets focuses on corporate
bonds(Klock,Mansi,Maxwell (2005); Bauer Hann (2010); Schneider (2011); Chava (2014);
Bektic (2017); Menz (2010); Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Suh (2013); Oikonomou Pavelin
(2014); Polbennikov,Descl´ Uzun (2015); Huang, Hu, Zhu (2018); Dynkin, Descl´ (2018);
Barth, Hübel, Scholz (2019)). Most of these studies report that a high ESG rating reduces the credit risk of corporate bonds; evidently indicates that the markets are rewarding
higher ESG scores with a lower cost of debt (credit spreads) and higher credit ratings.
More specifically, the authors document that environmental concerns are associated with a
higher cost of debt financing and lower credit ratings, and proactive environmental practices are associated with a lower cost of debt. Polbennikov, Desclée, Dynkin, Maitra
(2016) analyzes spread and performance for a corporate bond portfolio associated with
MSCI ESG rating. They find that high ESG ratings are accompanied by an incremental
1

there are two sets of work - one that compares ratings and another that considers whether ratings affect market prices
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increase in return and lower-than-average spreads. Making these mutually inconsistent
at first, but the authors concluded that the higher returns are from bonds issued before
ESG was a factor and from improving ESG scores. Oikonomou Pavelin (2014) study the
impact of various dimensions of sustainability performance on the Pricing of corporate
debt and credit quality of specific bond issues. Their analysis suggests that each CSR
factor substantially lessens the risk premia, reducing corporate debt costs. Cooper Uzun
(2015) find that firms with a strong performance on corporate social responsibility (CSR)
criteria have a lower debt cost. Moreover, Hoepner Nilsson (2017) show that bonds issued by companies that are indifferent significantly outperform the market benchmark.
Similarly, Chava (2014) shows that firms with multiple environmental concerns must pay
higher costs on their bank loans. They concluded that socially responsible lending can
impact the firm’s environmental policies through the cost of capital channels. Schneider
(2011) supports the hypothesis that a firm’s Environmental performance is reflected in
bond prices. Martellini, and Vallée (2021), demonstrate that implementation choices regarding how ESG constraints are incorporated in the context of sovereign bond portfolio
construction have a material impact on this opportunity cost. In particular, the authors
find that higher environmental scores for developed countries and higher social scores for
emerging countries are associated with lower borrowing costs for issuers and, consequently,
lower yields for investors. They also confirmed that negative screening with respect to ESG
screening leads to more diversified portfolios and lower tracking error levels relative their
respective benchmarks.

2.3

ESG and Credit Default Swaps Spread

Barth, Hübel, and Scholz (2020) investigated the implications of firms’ ESG practices for
credit default swap pricing (CDS). The authors provided evidence that higher ESG score
mitigate credit risks of both U.S. and European firms via cost of funding. They further
investigate the link between ESG scores and country credit risks, conducting a global
study that explores the impact of ESG performance on sovereign CDS spreads and the
time dimension of ESG through the term structures of sovereign credit curves. Analyzing
60 countries from 2007 to 2017, They found that ESG impacts both the level and slope of
the term structure of sovereign credit spreads: higher ESG performance is associated with
lower CDS spread and flatter CDS implied credit curves. This research is evidence of a
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long-term risk-mitigating effect of country sustainability. Another strand of the literature
focuses on linking sovereign bond spreads and credit ratings and one dimension of the
ESG criteria (E, S, or G). Kjerstensson, and Nygren (2019), looked at the relationship
between the ESG score of companies and its effect on the performance of their bonds
using bond yield spreads. The authors studied listed companies on the Nordic countries’
stock exchanges and established a relationship between ESG score and corporate bond
yield spread. They found no such relationship can be established. Therefore, it concluded
that a high ESG score does not imply a decreased level of required risk premium by bond
investors and a decreased or stabilized cost of debt for companies in the Nordic countries.
One would have expected to expect a similar finding for companies in the United States.

2.4

ESG and Popularity-based Pricing

Given the rise in Popularity of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing,
citing FF, various recent papers have put forth asset pricing models that incorporate ESG
(e.g., Pedersen, Fitzgibbon, and Pomorski, 2020). As a key example and demonstration
of the innovation of such models, Pedersen, Fitzgibbon, and Pomorski (2020) states; ”The
only other models of this form with many assets that we are aware of are provided by
FF (2007), who consider a model of investor ”taste,” Baker, Bergstresser, Serafeim, and
Wurgler (2018), who consider a model in which some investors prefer green bonds, and
Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2019) and Zerbib (2020), who consider ESG scores.” The
PAPM put forth in this paper belongs on this list, but the generalized asset pricing model
encompasses these models. While the various papers related to disagreement and tastes
are important, the PAPM put forth by IKI is the generalized asset pricing model. It
encompasses these new ESG-specific models allowing for any number of asset characteristics (including ESG, liquidity, brands, etc.) as well as a wide range of investors and
investor-specific expectations that could in part be related to asset characteristics. This
paper will use the PAPM framework to answer whether CDS spreads on corporate credit
are impacted by its ESG ratings. Given the growing and recent evidence that tastes for
investments with various ESG characteristics (e.g., avoiding tobacco, guns, carbon emissions, animal testing, child labor, etc.) impacts asset prices (Baker et al., 2020, Barber,
Morse, and Yasuda, 2020, Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin, 2005, Pástor, Stambaugh, and
Taylor, 2020, Pedersen, Fitzgibbon, and Pomorski, 2020, and Shafron, 2019), a general25

ized equilibrium asset pricing model that considers such tastes is needed. Consistent with
these ESG-focused papers, IIKX shows that popularity is a broad umbrella under which
nearly all market premiums and anomalies result from tastes. If a given characteristic is
broadly liked or disliked by enough investors, it impacts asset prices. The most popular
characteristics are expensive, decreasing expected returns, while the least popular characteristics are inexpensive, increasing expected returns. The notion that characteristics
impact prices and expected returns is consistent with Daniel and Titman’s empirical evidence (1997). They have found that security characteristics, rather than the covariance
structure of returns, explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns, thus credit risk
premium for its bonds.

2.5

Liquidity

The liquidity of an asset attribute, which is desirable and popular among investors, is defined as either in funding or in trading: our primary focus is on trading liquidity as reflected
by the CDS spread. Bunnermeirer and Perdersen (2009) argue that when traders (speculators, hedge funds, investment banks, all marked-to-market) buy security, they are required
to use some of their capital (difference between security’s price and its collateral value) to
finance the trade. Similarly, short selling requires a margin on all positions. Traders are
less willing to put on trades if funding is sparse, especially in capital-intensive securities,
which has direct consequences for liquidity across the entire market. Market liquidity is
difficult to define, especially since different market participants (for example, day traders
and pension funds) and different sides (buy or sell) might have different requirements of a
liquid market. Recent literature offers various definitions, and this section aims to extract
all aspects of the liquidity that might need to be considered when evaluating the liquidity
of a market or individual security. The resulting bid-ask spreads are of particular interest,
as they are central to the understanding and modeling of liquidity premia in this research.
A different branch of the microstructure literature, concerned with the decomposition of
the bid-ask spread, considers the components above, such as exogenous transaction costs,
private information, inventory risk, and search friction. In this study, I focus on the simple method of the bid-ask spread, and the early work on decomposing the bid-ask spread
focused on explaining quoted spreads cross-sectionally using market variables such as trading volume and security risk (Benston and Hagerman, 1974 and Demsetz, 1968). Other
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work decomposes the spread into adverse information dealer profit components (Glosten
and Harris, 1988 and Stoll, 1989), where the dealer profit represents compensation for
inventory holding and order processing costs. Estimates by Stoll (1989) and Madhavan
and Smidt (1991) indicate that inventory costs are relatively small for liquid asset classes
but increase substantially for illiquid assets. Hence, the remainder of the spread is mainly
determined by order processing costs and adverse information costs. Copeland and Galai
(1983) observe that order costs, the clerical costs of carrying out the transaction, including
the cost of the market makers’ time, are fixed irrespective of trade size. Therefore, the
average cost of order processing per unit decreases with trade size. The effect of informed
counterparties has been studied at length (see, for example, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985),
and models describe how dealers/market makers demand compensation for losses incurred
from counterparties with superior knowledge. Specifically, Lin et al. (1995) empirically
verifies a model developed by Easley and O’Hara (1987) in which well-informed traders
prefer to trade more significant amounts. With the above in mind, especially considering
the ’search friction’ identified by Amihud et al. (2006), another aspect of liquidity can be
defined as ’immediacy’; the ability to execute a trade contemporaneously. . Of course,
immediacy is highly dependent on the trade size; at any given point in time, the ability to
execute a trade with immediacy will differ substantially across small and large quantities.
This implies that liquidity does not only operate at the level of (international) financial
markets, varying by asset class or individual asset, but operates at a much more granular
level: individual trades. The most intuitive liquidity proxy I employed in this chapter is
the bid-ask spread, regarded as an ‘aggregate’ measure of liquidity (Hasbrouck and Seppi,
2001). The availability of bid-ask spread data is highly dependent on the choice of asset
class understudy, period, and granularity. An indirect, implicit approximation of the effective bid-ask spread introduced by Roll (1984), continues to be a widely used proxy in
recent empirical work (Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012 and Bao et al., 2011). The Roll measure
constructs implicit bid-ask spreads based on prices alone.
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Chapter 3

Data Description
3.1

Introduction

The research focuses on North American companies since there is data and a relatively
high level of liquidity among investment grade (IG) and sub-investment grade credits. The
sample comprises of Investment Grade (north of credit rating BBB-) and sub–investment
Grade or High Yield Bonds (south of credit ratings BBB-) that are exchange-listed in
the United States. The universe of companies is listed on the exchanges and possesses
an ESG score provided by Refinitiv. Unlisted companies possess very different company
characteristics and responsibilities that do not represent the sample population.
The dataset used in this Chapter comes from two primary sources, Refinitiv for the
ESG scores and ICE for the CDS spreads. The critical elements of the inputs that go into
estimating the default probabilities, the critical theoretical determinants of CDS spreads,
came from trade data provided by ICE Data Services Inc (Interactive Data Corporation
provides financial data and analysis services) via KRIS 1 .
In terms of how the data was sources, I collaborated with analyst at both Eikon Refinitiv
and Kamakura Corprateion (now part of SAS).I personally downloaded the data from
Eikon Refinitiv databasing using their Excel Addin, and since they were non-overlapping
data files I had to merge them by the following IDs in order to match the respective CDS
spreads and the ESG scores. This took place over a three months period.
The assigned ESG score is done on the equity level, not on a debt level; therefore, I
mapped the score to the company with its corresponding CDS spreads. Furthermore, the
primary target equity market investors (and due to data availability) mainly cover pub1

Kamakura Risk Integrated System from Kamakura Corporation
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licly traded companies, and their ratings correspond to equity security identifiers. Thus,
to obtain an ESG score for each credit in their database, one must first map it to equity
security for which an ESG rating is available (for each provider and each month). The
process was repeated for the sub-investment grade universe. However, the sub-investment
grade universe contrasts the I.G. universe, with much lower coverage. This is partly explained by the prevalence of private issuers of sub-investment grade or high yield debt.
Usually, the smaller size of high yield bond issuers relative to I.G. ones mean that covering
them could often be a less immediate priority for investors and ESG providers alike than
covering larger I.G. issuers. ESG scoring, by its very nature, is a complex and somewhat
subjective undertaking. ESG issues span many business practices; the three principal
pillar scores are calculated based on many component inputs. For example, within the
environmental score, different ESG providers focus on criteria such as a company’s energy
usage, its contribution to air and water pollution, or the extent of its recycling efforts.
These criteria are based on non-financial information assumed to be material to the company’s long-term sustainability. Despite standardization efforts by industry bodies, there
is no industry-wide consensus on which detailed environmental- and social-related criteria
should be used to evaluate a corporation and how the criteria should be weighted. The
universe looked at are all corporate bonds available in the DataStream tool provided by
Refinitiv, which have then been filtered to produce a representative sample including information on all variables I aim to take into our regression model. The time I have looked
at over ten years of monthly data, 2010-2021:q2. The overview of the ESG indicators
by Refinitiv is described below. All data was gathered with the Refinitiv Eikon add-in
from Microsoft Excel, then compiled to one excel master file containing all our data. I
also matched all variables to produce our observations. This data was later imported to
Stata 17.0, where I ran my regression models and did all our statistical tests, which will
be described in the following sub-chapters.

3.2

ESG Dataset

The data used for this study came from one source, Refinitiv, which captures and calculates
over 500+ company-level ESG data measures. A subset of 186 of the most comparable
and material per industry is used to arrive at the ESG scores. These 186 data measures
are divided into ten categories – Resource Use, Emissions, Innovation, Workforce, Human
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Rights, Community, Product Responsibility, Management, Shareholders, CSR Strategy.
These ten categories then are grouped under the following three pillars – Environment,
Social Governance (E, S, G). Category scores indicate the company performance in the
respective categories. The scores are calculated based on the below category benchmarks:
• To calculate the Environmental and Social category scores and the Controversies
score, TRBC Industry Group is used as the benchmark as these topics are more
relevant and like companies within the same industries.
• Country of Headquarters is used as the benchmark to calculate the Governance
category scores as best governance practices are more consistent within countries.
The ESG Scores are based on the percentile formula and are a relative performance
score of a company compared to its peers. Environmental and Social data measures and
Controversies are benchmarked against Industry Group and Governance measures against
the country of incorporation. Therefore, a comparison of scores between industry Groups
would not be of any value. One can compare the Environment and Social Pillar Score
of Companies belonging to the same Industry Group and Governance Pillar Score of
companies with the same incorporation country. They have different KPIs for different
industries based on relevance and transparency. Refer to the attached file to know about
KPI’s that are part of scoring for each industry. For ESG scores, Refinitiv captures and
calculates over 500 company-level ESG measures. The underlying measures are based on
considerations around comparability, impact, data availability, and industry relevance that
vary across each industry group. The Refinitiv ESG scores are data-driven, accounting for
the most material industry metrics, with minimal company size and transparency biases.
All the 186 data measures are divided into ten categories – Resource Use, Emissions,
Innovation, Workforce, Human Rights, Community, Product Responsibility, Management,
Shareholders, CSR Strategy. These ten categories then are grouped under the following
three pillars – Environment, Social Governance (E, S, G). Category scores indicate the
company performance in the respective categories.
Category weights will be calculated based on data to determine the relative importance
of each theme to each industry group. Based on the themes covered in each category,
suitable data points are identified which are used as a proxy for industry magnitude. The
Themes to data points (KPIs) have a one-to-one relationship, in other words, there is
one data point identified per the theme. For some themes, there are no KPIs that can be
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Source: Refinitiv

Figure 3.1: ESG Score Metrics
The detail was provided by Refinitiv methodology guidelines

used as good proxies of relative importance due to primarily insufficient disclosure. Across
categories of more than one theme and respective data points, the scoring methodology
takes the average of each data point per industry group to calculate the weight at a category
level. The category scores are rolled up into three-pillar scores – environmental, social,
and corporate governance. ESG pillar score is a relative sum of the category weights,
which vary per industry for the ’Environmental’ and ’Social’ categories. For ’Governance,’
the weights remain the same across all industries.
The three categories of ESG are increasingly integrated into investment analysis, processes, and decision-making. The ”E” captures energy efficiencies, carbon footprints,
greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, biodiversity, climate change and pollution mitigation, waste management and water usage. The ”S” covers labor standards, wages
and benefits, workplace and board diversity, racial justice, pay equity, human rights, talent management, community relations, privacy and data protection, health and safety,
supply-chain management, and other human capital and social justice issues. The ”G”
covers the governing of the ”E” and the ”S” categories—corporate board composition
and structure, strategic sustainability oversight and compliance, executive compensation,
political contributions and lobbying, and bribery and corruption.
The universe our dataset is focused US Dollar-denominated markets, both investment
grade(I.G.) and high yield (or sub-Investment grade, sIG). Eligibility for inclusion in both
categories is that at least two years of monthly ESG score is available, and at least corre-
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Table 3.1: ESG Score Indicator
Score Range

Description

0 to 25

First Quartile

>25 to 50

Second Quartile

>50 to 75

Third Quartile

>75 to 100

Fourth Quartile

Score within this range indicate poor relative ESG performance and an
insufficient degree of transparency in reporting material ESG data publicly.
This range indicates satisfactory relative ESG performance and a moderate
degree of transparency in reporting material ESG data publicly.
Scores within this range indicate good relative ESG performance and an
above-average degree of transparency in reporting material ESG data publicly.
A score within this range indicates excellent relative ESG performance and a high
degree of transparency in reporting material ESG data publicly.

source: Refinitiv

sponding CDS spread data is available.

3.2.1

Population sample

This study focuses on the United States of America credit market for the practicality
of data availability. The population universe across both Investment grade and subinvestment grade are companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and the availability of CDS Spread data, mainly the 5-year. In addition, I trust that listed companies
are likely to have an ESG score by Refinitiv and that unlisted companies are most likely
to have different characteristics and responsibilities that are not representative of our
purposes.

3.2.2

Investment grade universe

Our ESG Population of issuers is such that there are 565 companies for the I.G.s with
the following profile. As the materiality of the ESG scores are highly related to the
industry in which the firm operates, I grouped issuers into 11 industries using the GIC
category. The minimum and maximum values indicate that our variables do not seem to
contain erroneous data entries that could distort our empirical results. On the industry
sector level, Environmental and social ratings range between 1.59 and 95.19, averaging
around 50.74. In comparison, our sample firms exhibit, on average, lower governance
performances indicated by an average governance rating of 55. In each Sector, for the
individual component scores, if the data retrieved from the Eikon database is zero, it’s
replaced as blank. Since the lowest assigned score by Refinitiv is 1, this is very important
because it significantly affects the average and variability score across industries.
All corporate bonds issuers in the sample are available in the Eikon database tool
provided by Refinitiv, which have then been filtered to produce a representative sample
including information on all variables I aimed to take into our regression model. The time
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Figure 3.2: Industry Variation Among Investment Grades.

I have looked at ranges from 10 years 2010-2021 (up to the second quarter, June); this is
to ensure I have sufficient CDS spreads and ESG scores available but excluded companies
with less than two years ESG scores available. I decided upon this time frame to produce
a sample with enough observations to perform our statistical tests upon and with which I
could see the long-term effects of ESG score on corporate bonds issuers. I have not taken
older observations as I believe that might entail the risk of not finding proper ESG scores
for the bond issuers as it is a relatively new concept to the financial market. Refinitiv
has an ESG rating from 2002, mainly U.S. and European, but it was first from 2008
that the rating started to become more widespread (Refintiv, 2019, p. 5-6). A more
prolonged period might also introduce differences in the CDS market’s characteristics and
the financial landscape, which might be challenging to know and incorporate into our
model.
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CDS Spread
MktRFree
SMB
HML
StockReturn
StockVol
VIX
1yrExReturn
Mkt Leverage
ESG CScore
E Score
S Score
G Score

CDS Spread
1.0000
0.0798
0.1723
0.0939
-0.0012
0.0804
0.0579
-0.1180
-0.2057
-0.3224
-0.4744
-0.1950
-0.3924

1.0000
0.1573
0.1363
0.4845
0.1817
-0.3136
0.1270
-0.1790
0.1044
0.0561
0.1213
-0.0138

MktRFree

1.0000
0.0003
-0.0031
0.0793
0.0533
0.1234
-0.0581
-0.0646
-0.0465
-0.0449
-0.0826

SMB

1.0000
-0.2651
0.0903
-0.2561
-0.2267
0.0694
-0.0462
-0.1396
-0.0092
-0.0831

HML

1.0000
0.0855
-0.2277
0.2100
-0.2475
0.0648
0.0446
0.0744
-0.0106

StockReturn

1.0000
0.4304
0.3363
-0.5133
0.6750
0.5784
0.7134
0.0363

StockVol

1.0000
0.3725
-0.2603
0.2708
0.3636
0.2816
-0.0323

VIX

1.0000
-0.4184
0.3785
0.3876
0.2565
0.4512

1yrExReturn

1.0000
-0.2407
0.0083
-0.3710
0.2613

Mkt Leverage

1.0000
0.8193
0.9529
0.4049

ESG CScore

1.0000
0.7194
0.3750

E Score

1.0000
0.1191

S Score

1.0000

G Score

This table shows the connection between CDS spread and the determinant factors. The data contain 692 firms during the period from January 2010 to April 2021. It describes the correlation between the variables.

Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix of Determinants

3.2.3

Correlation analysis

This section explores the ability of firm-specific variables to vary cross-sectionally. Correlation coefficients between the variables are presented in Table 3.2. It shows that CDS
is relatively correlated with MarketLeverage and ESG score. This provides information
on how satisfactorily single factors are associated with CDS spread changes.All correlation coefficients between the independent variables and changes in CDS spreads have the
expected sign.

3.2.4

sub-Investment grade universe

As in the Investment grade sample universe, I have used data spanning over ten years
with 55 companies across the industry sectors. I eliminated companies with less than two
years’ worth of ESG scores.

3.3

Credit Default Swap

A company’s credit risk can be defined as the probability of a financial loss if borrowers
and counter-parties default on repaying their debt. Banks have traditionally traded this
risk via Credit Default Swap, and the associated premium is the spread; this is referred
to as CDS spread. A CDS is like an insurance contract in its most basic terms, providing
the buyer with protection against specific risks. Investors often buy credit default swaps
for protection against default, but these flexible instruments can be used in many ways
to customize exposure to the credit market. CDS contracts can mitigate risks in bond
investing by transferring a given risk from one party to another without transferring the
underlying bond or other credit assets. Before credit default swaps, there was no vehicle
to transfer the risk of a default or other credit event from one investor to another. A
single-name CDS contract structure is relatively straightforward; two parties are involved
in the contract, the protection buyer looking to insure against the possibility of default on
a particular bond and the protection seller, who is willing to bear the risk. The company
that issued the bond is referred to as the reference entity; the bond itself is the reference
issue. In case of a credit event (default, failure to pay, or other ’trigger’), the protection
seller agrees to buy the reference issue at face value and, in return, receives a default swap
premium, a periodic (quarterly) fee. The contract expires at the maturity date in case no
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credit event happens during its lifetime. If there is a credit event, the protection seller
buys the reference issue at face value and discontinues the periodic payments. It is then
reasonable to assume that credit risk can be measured using credit spread. Credit spread
is defined as follows:

Creditspread = BondY ield–Riskf reeRate

(3.1)

Moreover, studies by Hull (2000)[13] show that the credit spread is equivalent to the
CDS spread. The relationship between credit spreads and CDS spreads must hold under a
no-arbitrage argument, otherwise, an investor can make a risk-free profit. Blanco (2005)[6]
test this theoretical equivalence and find that the parity holds as a long-run equilibrium
condition. This analysis hypothesizes that a company’s ESG score would impact the
credit spreads via its popularity. Previous studies, as mentioned in the Literature review,
previous empirical studies have used CDS spreads to measure credit risk. Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein Martin (2001)[8] investigates credit risk using bonds credit spreads. Ericsson,
Jacobs, and Oviedo (2004)[10] use CDS spreads in their investigations of the credit risk,
albeit not treating ESG as investors’ preference. For this analysis, I chose to use CDS as
a proxy for credit spread performance given its following advantages:
1. isolation of credit risk given the instrument’s insensitivity to interest rate risk
2. constant maturity, removing the need for potential rolldown adjustments during the
simulation,
3. standardized structure, given a senior unsecured ranking and bullet maturity (lack
of optionality), allowing for more accurate performance comparisons.
The yield on a corporate bond is higher than on a ’risk-free’ gilt or swap, with the
additional yield referred to as the credit spread. This credit spread compensates investors
for the excess risk the holder bears; for example, the bond’s issuer may default, the bond’s
issuer may get downgraded, and the bond may be difficult to convert to cash, i.e., it is
illiquid. Whereas the default-related risk is always present and cannot be fully diversified
away, the difficulty to turn a bond into cash is easily avoided by holding the bond until
maturity. The argument goes that the bondholder can capture the value of that liquidity
risk premium in their valuation.
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3.3.1

Stock return

The Merton model suggests a negative connection between a firm’s Equity and its probability of default. I used monthly stock returns obtained from CRSP to indicate changes in
a firm’s Equity. Higher stock returns increase a firm’s value, which should decrease CDS
spreads theoretically. Hence, a negative relationship is expected between equity returns
and CDS spreads.

3.3.2

Stock volatility

The second theoretical determinant central to the Merton model is the volatility of the
firm value (Ibid). The difficulty with this measurement is that a firm’s volatility is unobservable. For that reason, proxies of the volatility are done by measuring historical
volatility. Historical volatility is based on historical stock data. Substantiated by option
theory, the price of an option should increase with the volatility of the underlying. This
is because the increasing volatility of the underlying makes it more probable that the put
option will be exercised. The value of the put option therefore increases with volatility,
which follows that an increase in volatility increases the probability of default. And since
the probability of default increases, the cost for insuring against default – reflected by the
CDS spread – should increase.

3.3.3

Market leverage

In Merton’s model, the firm’s leverage ratio is a key variable in determining the credit
spread. Leverage is defined as the firm’s debt (D) ratio to the firm value (V). Merton’s
model assumes that default occurs when the firm’s value falls below its debt value. Hence,
the higher the leverage (D/V), the higher the risk of default. With respect to the put
option expressed in the previous section, if D increases relatively more than V, and other
variables stay unchanged, then the price of the put option – and the credit spread – will
increase. Put in another way, the higher the leverage, the more likely it is that the firm
will default and hence the more costly the insurance against default should be. The cost
of this insurance is thus reflected by a higher CDS spread. Therefore, the CDS spread
should increase as leverage increases. In Merton’s approach, higher leverage indicates a
shorter distance to the default barrier and a higher probability of default. Therefore, the
effect of this control variable in the regression should be a positive correlation; thus, an
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increase in leverage should result in higher CDS spreads.

3.3.4

Liquidity

Like CGM , I included a proxy for the liquidity risk in the CDS market for our robustness regressions. I chose the bid-ask spread which has become a commonly used measure
of market liquidity. The motivation for this proxy of liquidity risk is that according to
Fleming (2003), the bid-ask spread outperforms other proxies when measuring liquidity
in the U.S. treasury market. As investors demand an additional premium for liquidity
risk, higher bid-ask spreads are associated with higher CDS spreads. Liquidity does not
require a behavioral explanation. Rational investors want more liquidity so that those
with longer horizons earn a liquidity premium. There are several potential measures of
liquidity, which are likely to measure somewhat different characteristics. Longstaff et. al.
(2005) discovered illiquidity to be characteristic for a bond’s default risk. The bid-ask
spread is simply the difference between the bid and ask CDS spread. Evidently, investors
demand an additional premium for liquidity risk, since the higher the bid-ask spreads
are, the higher the CDS spreads are. This bid-ask spread would provide us with valuable
information, in addition to raise the intensity of the explanatory factor. Amihud and
Mendelson (1986) document that fewer liquid stocks outperform more liquid stocks. Haugen and Baker (1996) and Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) show that low-turnover stocks
earn higher future returns than high-turnover stocks. Ibbotson et al. (2013) demonstrate
that liquidity premiums could be a missing style since liquidity premiums appear to be at
least comparable to size and value premiums. Building on stock level liquidity premiums,
Idzorek, Xiong, and Ibbotson (2012) found that after controlling for other characteristics,
mutual funds that held illiquid stocks outperformed, the same argument holds for bonds
(via CDS) net of fees. From a popularity perspective, all else equal, investors
Term Structure Slope
Although only the risk-free rate appears in Merton’s model the future movement of a
risk-free rate could be influenced by the slope of the yield curve. According to Carol et
al. (2007)[1], the steeper the yield curve, the higher expected future interest rates are.
Therefore, I expect a negative relationship between the slope of the yield and the CDS
spread.
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TBI Return
Transaction-based indices refer to a mode of monitoring the performance of the commercial
real estate market, and an overall liquidity in the financial system. Such indices are rare
since the acquisition of property is a personal endeavor. Appraisal-based indices are the
most common form of indices since, to some extent, investors are obliged to revalue the
assets they hold. Consequently, the appraisal-based index gives lagged and smoothed price
estimates in the market.
It is a forward indicator for cost living adjustment and business climate.Business climate could be seen as a macroeconomic variable. Including this variable, default probability could depend on the stages of the business climate. Both CGM and EJO proxy the
business climate of their U.S. datasets with the SP500, and they predict that an increase
in the SP500 will decrease the credit spread. This is quite logical, since when the economy
is booming firms are doing well, but when the economy is in a recession, the credit risk is
higher. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between the business climate and CDS
spreads.
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Chapter 4

Regression Methodology
4.1

Introduction

In this section, the Fixed-effect was adopted, since it explores the relationship between
the independent and dependent variables within an entity ( in this case within individual
companies). Each firm in the panel dataset has certain characteristics that may or may
not influence the independent variable. In this thesis, I am analyzing the effect that ESG
will have in CDS under ceteris paribus conditions. In addition, given that the Fixedeffects techniques assume that individual heterogeneity in a specific entity may bias the
independent or dependent variables, it will be most suitable to control for the bias as
mentioned earlier. And in this respect,the model removes the effect of time-invariant
characteristics.
The model used here is like that adopted by Gail, Shapir, and Ben-Zion (2012). They
examined the determinants of CDS spreads and spread changes, focusing on the classical
framework using the standard factor model, like the one adopted by Fama-French (2007).
In this model, I have adopted similar critical elements of determinants of CDS spreads.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein Martin (2001)[8] (henceforth CGM), where the authors investigated the credit risk by using bonds credit spreads, and that used by Angelini et
al.(2014)[2]. Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2004)[10] (henceforth EJO), use CDS spreads
in their investigations of the credit risk. Zhang et al. (2005)[17] examine the determinants
of CDS spreads.
This subsection presents our regression models and discusses the panel method by
which the regressions are estimated. The method is very similar to Eberhardt (2012)[9]
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which uses Mean Group (MG) estimators, and we also adopted the Pooled Mean Group
(PMG) estimator for the non-stationary aspect of the data-set as in Blackburn III (2007)[5].
Panel data regressions are suitable for our analysis since our data contain both a crosssectional and a time-series dimension. Some benefits of panel data are that it permits
more degrees of freedom, reduces collinearity among variables, and accounts for the heterogeneity of individual cross-sections or the characteristics of each firm. At the end MG
and PMG are compared using Hausman test.
This analysis has been carried out through two models at fixed effects to exploit both
the information within and that between, which is included in the dataset through a GLS
analysis. The model is also assessed with a dynamic fixed-effect (DFE) and random effect
panel regression to check its stability. As described in the previous sections, Merton’s
model states that credit spread is a function of the value of the asset volatility, risk-free
rate and leverage. The first empirical model denotes the following structure:
In this model the core determinants from the Merton’s model were employed plus
additional common factor such as [one year return On the MIT TBI Commercial Real
Estate Index] and the slope of the terms structure between the 2-year and the 10-year rates
with the combined ESG scores. The regressions are done conducted over a number of
periods. Firstly, the universe of data use covered the mixture of Investment Grade (156
names) and sub-Investment Grade (55 names),over the periods 2010 to 2021, 2010 to 2015,
and then 2015 to 2021.

CDSt,i = α0,i + β1 EquityReturnt,i + β2 MarketLeveraget,i + β3 MarketVolatilityt,i
+ β4 ExcessReturn1yrt,i + β5 ReturnTBIt,i

(4.1)

+ β6 TermStructSlopet,i + β ESG ESG Scoret,i + εt,i
Equation (4.1) shows the ability of structural variables consistent with Merton (1974)
model (equity return, volatility and leverage), of which is referred to in this section as
Merton’s model, to explain CDS spreads. It should be noted that the risk-free interest
rate, which is also used in the Merton (1974) model, has to be omitted in a cross-section
analysis. In this model the core determinants from the Merton’s model were employed
with the individual pillars E,S, and G scores.
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CDSt,i = α0,i + β1 EquitykReturnt,i + β2 MarketLeveraget,i + β3 MarketVolt,i
+ β4 ExcessReturn1yrt,i + β5 ReturnTBIt,i + β6 TermStructSlopet,i

(4.2)

+ β E E Scoret,i + β S S Scoret,i + β G G Scoret,i + εt,i
In this model the core determinants from the Merton’s model were employed with the
individual pillar E.

CDSt,i = α0,i + β1 EquitykReturnt,i

+β2 MarketLeveraget,i + β3 MarketVolt,i

+ β4 ExcessReturn1yrt,i

+β5 ReturnTBIt,i + β6 TermStructSlopet,i

+ β E E Scoret,i

+εt,i
(4.3)

In this model the core determinants from the Merton’s model were employed with the
individual pillar S.

CDSt,i = α0,i + β1 EquityReturnt,i

+β2 MarketLeveraget,i + β3 MarketVolt,i

+ β4 ExcessReturn1yrt,i

+β5 ReturnTBIt,i + β6 TermStructSlopet,i

+ β S S Scoret,i

+εt,i
(4.4)

In this model the core determinants from the Merton’s were employed with the individual pillar G.

CDSt,i = α0,i + β1 EquityReturnt,i

+β2 MarketLeveraget,i + β3 MarketVolt,i

+ β4 ExcessReturn1yrt,i

+β5 ReturnTBIt,i + β6 TermStructSlopet,i

+ β G G Scoret,i

+εt,i
(4.5)

In the above model the CDS spread is of firm i at the end of month t. The ESG Scoret,i
is the respective combined ESG score. The EquityReturnt,i , M arketV olt,i , ExcessReturn1yrt,i ,
ReturnT BIt,i , and T ermStrucSlopet,i are the other determinants. ηi comprises firm fixed
effects that absorb any unobserved time-constant firm characteristics and vt includes time
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fixed effects. εi,t is the i.i.d. standard normal error term. The panel methodology allows
us to consider cross-sectional and temporal variation simultaneously. All standard errors
are double-clustered at firm month levels to account for cross-sectional and serial correlation in the error terms. And β ESG is the main coefficient for this analysis. It captures the
marginal effect of ESG score on CDS spreads.
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Chapter 5

Empirical Results Analysis
5.1

Empirical Results Analysis

To understand the effect of ESG scores on corporate credit risk via CDS spreads, the model
regresses all the key independent variables that determines default probability along with
the ESG scores via panel regression. Results of the empirical analysis carried out are
illustrated in this section. The model has been estimated through a panel regression that
uses three panel time-series estimators allowing for heterogeneous slope coefficients across
group members adopted by Markus Eberhardt [9]

In the first model credit spread is set as a dependent variable while the independent
variables are all the theoretical determinants of the Merton’s model and the universe of
potential determinants for the investment grade companies are listed in Table 5.1. In
deciding on the universe of the determinants we Looked at the major inputs that goes into
determining the default probability or the distance to default in the Merton’s model. The
loadings of these inputs are considered as the degree of popularity.
In addition, to assess the effect of each ESG component, we replace the overall ESG
index with E (environmental quality index), S (social quality index), and G (governance
quality index). Both social and governance performance have a significantly negative
correlation with sovereign funding cost. This result is unchanged based on Beyond Ratings
ESG scores.
Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of the CDS spreads and the main determinants
factors. The Bid/Ask Spread as a proxy for liquidity was excluded due to high level of
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collinearity with the actual CDS spread levels, since it was calculated as simple the Bid
minus the Ask.
Table 5.1: Investment Grade and sub Investment Grade Summary Statistics
This

table

presents

2021.It

describes

nants.

The

the

spread

the

descriptive

variables
and

statistics

divided

firm-specific

VARIABLES
Bid
Ask
BidAksSpread
CDS Spread
ESG Score
E Score
S Score
G Score
MarketLeverage
ExcessReturn1yr
MarketVolatility(VIX)
ReturnTBI
TermStructSlope(10y-2y)
EquityReturn

into

of
five

variables

the

dataset

groups:
are

for

spread

calculated

the

period

variables,

using

data

from

January

firm-specific
from

250

2010

variables

rated

and

as

to

April

determi-

unrated

firms

Observations

Mean

Min

Max

StdDev

28,397
28,397
28,397
27,775
27,105
25,773
27,105
27,048
28,397
28,397
28,397
28,397
28,397
27,876

2.065
2.353
11.86
153.5
57.76
55.68
58.39
60.11
0.486
0.0235
18.45
0.0914
-0.398
1.230

0.0842
0.0968
0.0377
10.32
7.390
0.433
0.865
1.337
0.0263
-1.151
9.510
-0.225
-2.410
-70.92

32.51
35.64
225.2
4,311
95.19
98.55
98.09
98.53
0.996
11.30
53.54
0.299
1.500
147.0

2.855
3.212
13.75
225.4
18.33
25.01
21.03
20.74
0.223
0.434
7.034
0.0999
0.975
9.824

From Table 5.2, The sample pool consists of both investment and sub-investment grade
credits; using the fixed effect panel regression model, it is evident that all the major inputs
of the Merton’s model with exception of Stock Return are significant at the 1% confidence
level, and with R2 being approximate 14%. The combine ESG is particularly significant,
and the sign of the coefficient is inversely related to the CDS spread as expected, the
high ESG score mean imply a lower cost of funding and more stable stream of income, so
implies lower credit risk, implying lower default probability and therefore lower spread.

45

46

Observations
R-squared

Constant

G Score

S Score

E Score

ESG Score

1yrExcReturn

ReturnTBI

termStructSlope

MarketLeverage

MarketVolatility

EquityReturn

VARIABLES

-0.128
(0.0784)
-0.879***
(0.0971)
0.418***
(0.0570)
-78.41***
(8.337)

-0.0591
(0.0799)
1.396***
(0.134)
467.1***
(10.37)
-5.397***
(0.957)
31.62***
(8.426)
-34.89***
(2.021)

(Model2)
CDS

-95.84***
(6.812)

-0.366***
(0.0696)

-0.0370
(0.0799)
1.369***
(0.134)
474.9***
(10.35)
-5.214***
(0.957)
35.65***
(8.411)
-33.60***
(2.021)

(Model3)
CDS

-93.07***
(7.815)

-0.894***
(0.0890)

0.0128
(0.0820)
1.487***
(0.140)
536.3***
(10.37)
-5.306***
(0.999)
46.97***
(8.665)
-31.84***
(2.076)

(Model4)
CDS

26,220
24,817
24,907
26,220
0.149
0.140
0.136
0.151
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-108.1***
(8.092)

0.0218
(0.0821)
1.466***
(0.140)
540.0***
(10.36)
-5.057***
(1.000)
50.85***
(8.665)
-31.07***
(2.075)
-0.673***
(0.0976)

(Model1)
CDS

26,146
0.138

0.139**
(0.0569)
-143.4***
(6.420)

0.0370
(0.0806)
1.491***
(0.137)
513.4***
(10.31)
-4.792***
(0.981)
52.93***
(8.413)
-29.05***
(2.021)

(Model5)
CDS

Table 5.2: Fixed Effect for both IG and SubIG Regression Results of All Proposed Models over 2010 to 2021

As indicated in Table 5.2, The Market Volatility, Leverage, Slope of the Yield Curve,
return excess of TBI, and 1yr Excess Return are all significant at 1% level. And the combined score for the ESG is also statistically significant. This result is not surprising since
investment grade corporate credits dominate the sample universe. This result is similar
to that of Table 5.3, which narrows the sample universe to just investment grade credits.
However, with the sample universe restricted to the sub-Investment Grade in Table 5.4,
the combined score for the ESG proved to be not significant of 1% level, the fundamental
reason behind this is because the credit spread is dominated by the determinants of default
probability as opposed to ESG concerns.
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Observations
R-squared

Constant

G Score

S Score

E Score

ESG Score

1yrReturn

ReturnTBI

TermStructSlope

MarketLeverage

MarketVol

EquityReturn

VARIABLES

-0.176***
(0.0413)
-0.449***
(0.0504)
-0.0228
(0.0313)
-54.53***
(4.665)

-0.104**
(0.0486)
0.720***
(0.0694)
364.3***
(6.36)
-2.283***
(0.494)
47.16***
(4.295)
-12.73***
(1.632)

(M2)
CDS

-75.42***
(3.928)

-0.351***
(0.0365)

-0.0886*
(0.0486)
0.708***
(0.0695)
367.8***
(6.362)
-2.226***
(0.495)
51.25***
(4.280)
-11.55***
(1.629)

(M3)
CDS

19,920
19,287
19,287
0.216
0.227
0.224
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-51.11***
(4.390)

-0.0958**
(0.0477)
0.753***
(0.0683)
351.20***
(6.153)
-2.115***
(0.485)
45.46***
(4.152)
-12.43***
(1.601)
-0.599***
(0.0484)

(M1)
CDS

19,920
0.218

-48.24***
(4.171)

-0.628***
(0.0432)

-0.101**
(0.0477)
0.768***
(0.0682)
349.8***
(6.143)
-2.177***
(0.485)
43.44***
(4.154)
-12.77***
(1.597)

(M4)
CDS

19,920
0.211

-0.153***
(0.0297)
-82.51***
(3.440)

-0.0662
(0.0478)
0.748***
(0.0685)
360.1***
(6.131)
-1.776***
(0.486)
51.02***
(4.136)
-9.829***
(1.590)

(M5)
CDS

Table 5.3: Fixed Effect Investment Grade Regression Results of All Proposed Models over 2010 to 2021

The results shown in both Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that considerations of popularity
are important for the investment-grade universe as most of the companies are more matured and their adherence and transparency to the individual pillars of ESG has become
part their strategic goals, given their negative correlation and coefficients of the combined
ESG score as well as for the individual pillars. The higher the scores, the lower the spreads,
and investor prefer companies with tighter CDS spreads, making them more popular. The
results for the sub-investment grade universe wasn’t as strong, indicating the combined
ESG scores were unpopular among investors.
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9.050
(35.96)

3,920
0.114
55

Observations
R-squared
Number of id

0.458*
(0.257)
3.681***
(0.621)
396.4***
(39.86)
-6.958
(4.838)
-112.9
(88.71)
-66.58***
(6.324)
0.198
(0.531)
4.010***
(0.532)
-3.174***
(0.610)
-0.252
(0.358)
50.98
(45.08)

0.415
(0.281)
3.990***
(0.672)
361.2***
(46.02)
-5.482
(5.280)
-151.2
(97.27)
-72.76***
(6.826)

(2)
qCDS Spread

-80.33**
(33.85)

2.678***
(0.452)

0.442
(0.278)
3.564***
(0.659)
387.5***
(44.98)
-4.367
(5.163)
-105.8
(94.93)
-72.18***
(6.766)

(3)
qCDS Spread

3,508
3,598
0.128
0.122
55
55
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
qCDS Spread

Constant

G Score

S Score

E Score

ESG Score

1yrExcessReturn

ReturnTBI

TermStructSlope

MarketVolatility

MarketVolatility

EquityReturn

VARIABLES

3,920
0.115
55

60.19*
(34.83)

-0.876*
(0.468)

0.455*
(0.257)
3.826***
(0.621)
398.2***
(39.69)
-7.311
(4.840)
-156.2*
(88.22)
-65.73***
(6.300)

(4)
qCDS Spread

3,780
0.116
55

0.180
(0.335)
-5.046
(33.80)

0.459*
(0.264)
3.805***
(0.636)
421.9***
(41.82)
-7.059
(5.017)
-102.0
(89.25)
-65.13***
(6.454)

(5)
qCDS Spread

Table 5.4: Fixed Effect sub-Investment Grade Regression Results of All Proposed Models over 2010 to 2021

Chapter 6

Robustness Test
6.1

Different Vendor Dataset

As a robustness check, again the use of CDS spreads is adopted as a dependent variable.
CDS spreads are regarded as a purely market-driven measure of corporate credit risk. In
most cases, they are more liquid than the underlying physical bonds, and are immune to
liquidity constraints. The results remain unchanged when I used the MSCI dataset even
though the correlation between the ESG score is around 60%. MSCI ESG Ratings data are
a successor to the MSCI KLD data used in many academic studies. According to Eccles
and Stroehle (2018), MSCI is the world’s largest provider of ESG ratings. One needs to be
mindful of the correlation between Refinitiv’s data and that of MSCI. Table 6.1 shows the
output for the regression using the ESG date from MSCI for the investment-grade credit.
And the regression was done separately for the sub-investment grade credit the results is
shown in Table 6.2, the results are similar with that of Refinitiv dataset, in terms of the
siginificance of ESG as a determinant for the CDS spreads.
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52

-97.52*
(55.25)

16,845
149

Observations
Number of id

0.101
(0.119)
0.0370
(0.0274)
-0.0179
(0.0153)
-110.8*
(57.57)

-0.00816
(0.0215)
0.465***
(0.0905)
297.7***
(62.53)
-1.576**
(0.777)
26.10**
(12.19)
5.623
(3.766)

(Model 2)
CDS Spread

-103.5**
(49.57)

0.0744
(0.105)

0.00736
(0.0202)
0.479***
(0.0975)
292.0***
(56.12)
-2.184***
(0.833)
39.38***
(12.64)
7.303**
(3.526)

(Model 3)
CDS Spread

16,844
16,844
149
149
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.00465
(0.0208)
0.505***
(0.107)
281.1***
(61.94)
-2.410***
(0.909)
40.87***
(12.56)
5.013
(3.663)
-0.0205
(0.0174)

Constant

G Score

S Score

E Score

ESG Score

1yrExcessReturn

ReturnTBI

TermStrucSlope

MarketLeverage

MarketVolatility

EquityReturn

VARIABLES

(Model 1)
CDS Spread

16,844
149

-110.0*
(59.67)

0.0467**
(0.0227)

-0.00585
(0.0212)
0.506***
(0.107)
281.4***
(65.60)
-2.392***
(0.853)
37.63***
(12.67)
4.881
(4.211)

(Model 4)
CDS Spread

16,844
149

-0.0177
(0.0128)
-74.78
(50.46)

-0.00386
(0.0217)
0.551***
(0.106)
257.5***
(57.76)
-2.203***
(0.845)
44.06***
(12.76)
4.615
(3.292)

(Model 5)
CDS Spread

Table 6.1: Investment Grade Regression Results of All Proposed Models: Data from MSCI

6.2

Hausman Test

According to the results from running the hausman test for the model in the Table xx,
since the p-value is 0, we reject the Random effect model and accept Fixedeffect model as
more germane and appropriate for this model.

Coefficients
Models
Fixed (f )

Random(r)

Difference (f-r)

Stand. Err

EquityReturn

0.021786

.0241908

-.0024048

.0009399

MarketVolatility

1.465932

1.480443

-.0145106

.0032091

MarketLeverage

540.0408

532.4016

7.639212

2.192292

TermStructSlope

-5.056517

-5.209051

.152534

.0271598

ReturnTBI

50.85488

50.32458

.530297

.1834229

1yrExcess Return

-31.06976

-31.00465

-.065114

.0993697

ESG Score

-0.72931

-0.734265

0.061334

0.015534

F = 114.67

p-value = 0.0000

6.3

Endogeneity bias and reverse causality

A model such as this one, looking at the impact of ESG Score on Corporate Credit
spread, could not generate an endogenous relationship (i.e., omitted variable bias and reverse causality) between a firm’s ESG score and corporate credit spread, since potentially
the adherence to ESG policies could impact the cost of funding for the firm and liquidity
of its CDS spreads, but not the other way round. However, Buchanan et al (2018)[7]
study the relationship between ESG and firm value in the context of influential institutional ownership and argue that there might be a recursive relation between ESG and the
financial performance of firms entailing an endogeneity problem. At the same time the
test for endogeneity and reverse causality for this body of research is still in a relatively
early stage and it is not sufficiently clear to what extent these models can explain patterns
uncovered by empirical research on how CDS spreads impact ESG scores. In addition,
asset pricing models that aim to predict corporate bond spreads not only depend on transaction costs, but also on liquidity risk. The available evidence indicates that liquidity is
an important factor in asset pricing. However, most studies do not explicitly examine
whether ESG factors can be explained by liquidity factors, which is excluded as a deter53

54

-632.3
(420.9)

3,920
55

Observations
Number of id

-2.137
(4.344)

0.460
(0.313)
4.327***
(1.213)
1,059**
(413.1)

(Model 1)
CDS Spread

Constant

ESG Score

G Score

S Score

E Score

ESG Score

1yrExcessReturn

ReturnTBI

TermStrucSlope

MarketLeverage

MarketVolatility

EquityReturn

VARIABLES

3,414
56

-4.959
(4.601)
-997.7
(702.4)

0.204
(0.181)
7.759*
(3.966)
1,392*
(743.5)
-7.457
(10.65)

-0.172
(0.503)
-1,086
(702.4)

0.274
(0.183)
3.954***
(1.050)
1,480**
(741.6)
-9.432
(10.91)
222.9**
(102.9)

(Model 3)
CDS Spread

0.0904
(0.673)
-1,416
(946.2)

0.246
(0.154)
3.759***
(0.990)
1,816*
(985.6)
-6.217
(11.09)
244.9**
(106.5)
-9.767
(13.41)

(Model 4)
CDS Spread

3,407
3,407
55
55
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(Model 2)
CDS Spread

3,406
55

-1,720*
(1,002)

0.0872
(1.535)
0.0955
(1.025)
0.423
(0.536)

0.272*
(0.161)
3.719***
(0.840)
2,176**
(998.3)
-4.128
(11.82)
132.3
(108.1)
18.57
(12.70)

(Model 5)
CDS Spread

Table 6.2: sub-Investment Grade Regression Results of All Proposed Models: Data from MSCI

3,406
55

-1,625*
(962.1)

0.860
(1.243)

0.230
(0.151)
3.738***
(0.967)
1,998**
(991.7)
0.519
(12.40)
212.3**
(89.72)
-5.871
(15.52)

(Model 6)
CDS Spread

3,406
55

-1,260
(844.6)

-0.0216
(0.684)

0.307*
(0.161)
3.951***
(0.914)
1,665*
(868.4)
-9.454
(10.44)
224.5**
(100.2)
-5.710
(11.61)

(Model 7)
CDS Spread

minant due to its collinearity with the CDS spreads. In the framework of popularity-based
pricing, ESG factors can be linked to the behavior of less rational investors, in the sense
that these investors may prefer assets with specific characteristics. These developments
resulted in major ESG-related risks for firms, arising from regulatory action and changes
in customer behavior (Hübel and Scholz 2020). Hermalin and Weisbach (2001)[?] suggest
that a firm’s governance structure is endogenously determined. Bouslah et al. (2013)
find a bidirectional causality between corporate social performance and firm risk. Given
this, it is possible that ESG disclosure and credit risk via CDS spreads are determined
simultaneously: that is, not only does ESG disclosure influence firm risk—firms also adjust ESG disclosure based on the current risk exposure. In such circumstances, current
ESG disclosure is likely to be influenced by a past realization of credit risk (i.e., reverse
causality). In this paper, I address this issue by lagging indepependent variable, ESG to
control for reverse causality, as this help to control for reverse causality and thus tend to
be less susceptible to endogeneity effects.

CDSt,i = β0,i + β1 StockReturnt−1,i

+β2 MarketLeveraget−1,i + β3 VIXt−1,i

+ β4 ExReturn 1 yrt−1,i

+β5 ReturnTBIt−1,i

+ β6 TERMt−1,i

+β7 ESG Scoret−1,i + ϵt,i

(6.1)

To mitigate these reverse causality issues, I estimated alternative specifications of
Equation 4.1 (6.1 above). Specifically, I test the influence of the ESG score in the previous
year on the CDS spread in the current year(6.1). I report the results in Column 2 (Lag 1)
and Column 3 (Lag 2) of Table 6.3. As can be seen from these results, ESG is negatively
related to CDS, suggesting that the prior-year ESG inversely affects the current year’s
credit risk. These results suggest that the direction of causation runs from ESG disclosure
to credit risk but not vice versa.
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Table 6.3: ESG and CDS Spread—endogeneity bias (lagged independent variables)

Lag 1

Lag 2

VARIABLES

qCDS

qCDS

EquityReturn

-0.105
(0.0916)
2.731***
(0.155)
7.911*
(4.102)
-12.67***
(1.102)
80.58***
(9.551)
6.412***
(2.213)
-0.272***
(0.0497)
103.8***
(13.37)

0.117
(0.0920)
2.736***
(0.155)
0.427
(4.119)
-12.76***
(1.107)
81.87***
(9.595)
5.267**
(2.233)
-0.1427***
(0.0499)
99.20***
(13.26)

MarketVol
MarketLeverage
TermStructSlope
ReturnTBI
1yrExcReturn
ESG
Constant

Observations
26,189
26,200
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 7

Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis deviates from the conventional asset pricing models and has
combined both classical and behavioral finance to analyze the impact of ESG on credit
risk pricing. The majority of literature in analyzing ESG has been treated as a risk factor.
I have treated ESG as a preference or a non-risk factor. The non-risk factors ( behavioral) incorporate that heterogeneity is a fact of life, and people differ in how they form
judgments. As with liquidity, not every investor equally cares about ESG disclosure in
their investment decision. The popularity-based framework (PAPM) provides a needed
improvement over the CAPM by incorporating the two critical ingredients identified by
Fama and French. The PAPM leads to robust findings and important real-world implications for practitioners. By incorporating diverse opinions and allowing for various investor
preferences/tastes, the PAPM takes two significant steps towards a more realistic asset
pricing model while helping to bridge classical and behavioral finance.
This analysis was conducted over a decade from January 2010 to April 2021. However,
when the United Nations Principles on Responsible Investment were undertaken in 2006,
companies did not have a clear cohesive guideline as to what universally constitutes sustainability. Data vendors did not have a robust database of their scores until 2010. This is
really when institutional investors had just started to pay attention to ESG. In addition,
companies face growing public awareness of their sustainability practices, increasing regulatory pressure, and comprehensive disclosure requirements. As credit rating agencies shift
their focus toward ESG, these developments raise the question of whether credit markets
reflect the sustainability practices of firms. I contribute to this question and apply credit
default swap (CDS) spreads to examine whether markets price the popularity of firms’
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ESG practices among investors. My findings indicate a significant and negative relationship between ESG and credit risk based on a sample of 20,551 firm-month observations
representing 250 U.S firms from January 2010 to April 2021.
This result is robust to endogeneity, reverse causality tests, and controls for established
credit spread determinants and firm-and time-level unobservable heterogeneity. This is
supporting evidence for the risk mitigation view, which links better ESG performance to a
reduction in firm risk, and, thus, credit risk. I find that for the sample universe of the U.S.
corporate credit market, both investment grade and high yield (sub-investment grade)
and concluded that ESG as a preference is significant in terms of the long-term credit risk
protection spread levels for the entire universe as well as investment grade credit. Still, I
did not find a significant relationship between ESG and CDS spreads for sub-investment
grade credits. One possible reason is that the entire sample consisted of 75% investment
grade credit and 25% of sub-investment grade credit.
Regarding the significance of ESG to the sub-investment grade credit, it would be
reasonable to assume that the credit protection spread would be heavily influenced or
dominated by its probability of default. Further analysis could have been conducted across
industries. In addition, the possibility of examining the effect of ESG on the tail-risk should
also be investigated. In summary, through this analysis, it is established that there is a link
between ESG and credit risk via CDS spreads, especially with investment grade credits.
As a result, firms’ ESG disclosure can be considered an additional determinant of their
CDS spreads. Practitioners could gain a tremendous insight into portfolio construction to
generate alpha by factoring in ESG exposure of firms in the security selection.
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Appendix A
MSCI ESG Ratings Methodology Overview
MSCI ESG Ratings aim to measure a company’s resilience to long-term, financially relevant ESG risks.
• Of the negative externalities that companies in an industry generate, which issues
may turn into unanticipated costs for companies in the medium to long-term?
• Conversely, which ESG issues affecting an industry may turn into opportunities for
companies in the medium to long-term?
More specifically, the MSCI ESG Ratings model seeks to answer four key questions
about companies:
• What are the most significant ESG risks and opportunities facing a company and
its industry?
• What are the most significant ESG risks and opportunities facing a company and
its industry?
• How exposed is the company to those key risks and/or opportunities?
• How well is the company managing key risks and/or opportunities?
• What is the overall picture of a company and how does it compare to its global
industry peers?

MSCI ESG Ratings Process
Data Sources
To assess companies’ exposure to and management of ESG risks and opportunities, The
firm collects data from the following sources:
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• Macro data at segment or geographic level from academic, government, NGO datasets
(e.g., Transparency International, US EPA, World Bank)
• Company disclosure (10-K, sustainability report, proxy report, AGM results, etc.)
• Government databases, 3,400+ media, NGO, other stakeholder sources regarding
specific companies
Issuer Communications and Feedback Process
The firm proactively reach out to companies as part of our standardized and systematic
data review processes. They do not issue surveys or questionnaires or conduct general
interviews with companies, nor do they accept or consider in our analysis any data provided
by issuers that is not publicly available to other stakeholders. Being mindful of the “survey
fatigue” faced by issuers, we make efforts not to overburden companies with data review
requests. Typically, companies receive an alert, when the ESG Rating review is complete.
Given the dynamic nature of our research, companies can access the data we have collected
to date via the issuer portal at any time to review. They are welcome to ask questions and
provide feedback at any time. They commit to updating a company profile as required
promptly. This process is also in accordance with the objective of frequently updating
company exports with the latest available information as provided by companies. Please
note that updates to ESG data will not necessarily result in changes to a company’s ESG
rating or score.
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Appendix B
The Popularity Asset Pricing Model
A presentation of the mathematical formulation is done in this section adopted from the
monograth for The CFA Institute by Roger Ibbotson [?]. The PAPM is a generalization
of the CAPM in which securities have characteristics other than risk and expected return
that investors are concerned about.Its assumptions are:
1. Taxes, transaction costs, and other real-world considerations can be ignored.1
2. Each security has a bundle of characteristics.
3. Investors have preferences regarding these characteristics in addition to their preferences regarding risk and expected return.
4. All investors use a generalized form of Mean-Variance Optimization (MVO) that
incorporates their preferences regarding security characteristics.
5. All investors have the same forecasts,; i.e., the same capital market assumptions
(expected returns, standard deviations, and correlations.)
6. All investors agree on what the characteristics of the securities are.
7. All investors can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate without limit
The conclusions of the PAPM are:
1. The market portfolio is not on the efficient frontier.
2. Each investor forms a customized portfolio of the risky assets that reflects his attitudes towards security characteristics. This portfolio is combined with the risk-free
1

While things like taxes can be ignored, a strength of the PAPM is that they could be easily incorporated as a characteristic
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asset (long or short). Portfolio optimization is required to find the overall investorspecific portfolio.
3. The expected excess return of each security is a linear function of its beta and its
popularity loadings which measure the popularity of the security based on its characteristics relative to the those of the beta-adjusted market portfolio. The popularity
loadings are multiplied by the popularity premiums which are aggregations of the
preferences of the investors regarding the characteristics. In this way, the market aggregates investor preferences in determining the influence of security characteristics
on the expected returns and prices of the securities.
Note that the conclusions of the PAPM are nearly the exact opposite of those of
the CAPM. Additionally, conclusion (2) is much more consistent with observed investor
portfolios.
 − ′→
λi − ′
−
Ui →
xi = →
µ i−
xi − →
max
x Ψxi
−
→
2 i
xi

(1)

where
n

= the number of risky securities in the market

→
−
µi
s views
Ψ

= the n-element vector of expected security excess returns reflecting investor i′
9

= the n × n variance-covariance matrix of returns on the risky securities

→
−
xi

= the n-element vector of investor i’s allocations (portfolio weights) to the risky

securities
λi

10

= the risk aversion parameter of investor i

−
Based on investor i ’s forecasts →
µ i and risk aversion coefficient λi , investor i seeks to
maximize utility.
From the first-order condition, leads to:

→
−
µ i = λi Ψxi

(2)

1
→
−
−
x i = Ψ1 →
µi
λi

(3)

Solving for ⃗xi , gives:
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In other words, from equations 2 and 3 , it could be started with either an investor’s
portfolio holdings or expected excess returns and solve for the other.
Let
m

= the number of investors

wi

= the fraction of wealth held by investor i;

Pm

i=1 wi

=1

Note the utility function is quadratic in portfolio weights, leading to the optimal portfolio weights being linear in expected returns.
By excess returns, we mean in excess of the return on a risk-free security.
P
There is a risk-free security to which investor i allocates 1 − nj=1 xij . Aggregating
across investors, in equations 4,5 , and 6 , we have the market average level of risk aversion

−
(λM ), market-weighted average of investor expected security excess returns →
µ M , and
the market portfolio (⃗xM ) consisting of the weighted aggregation of the security weights
of the investors:
1
λM = Pm

wi
i=1 λi
m
X

→
−
µ M = λM

i=1

→
−
xM =

m
X

wi →
−
µi
λi

(4)

−
wi →
xi

i=1

Aggregating equation 3 across investors, in which it is solved for each investor’s portfolio based on their expectations, we have the asset-weighted average holdings (the market
portfolio):
1 −1 →
→
−
Ψ −
µM
xM =
λM

(5)

→
−
µ M = λM Ψ⃗xM

(6)

So that:

Equation 9 decomposes the right side of equation 3, to show that each investor’s
portfolio differs from the market portfolio due to the difference between each investor i’s
expected security excess returns and the market-weighted average security excess returns:

λM →
1
→
−
−
−
−
xi =
x M + Ψ−1 →
µi − →
µM
λi
λi
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(7)

Note that the first term on the right-hand side is same as in the standard CAPM,
the fraction of the market average portfolio owned by investor i. The second term on the
right-hand side pinpoints that the uniqueness of investor i ’s portfolio is driven by the
difference between the investor’s expected excess returns and the market average excess
returns. Note the similarity of equation 9 to the Black-Litterman (1992) model in which
an investor’s views about expected returns on assets are combined with market consensus
views to arrive at an investor’s expectations and ultimately their specific portfolio.
The expected excess return on the market portfolio remains:

−
−
µM
µM = →
x M ′→

(8)

−
Multiplying equation 8 through by →
x ′M , yields:

2
µM = λM σM

(9)

−
2 =→
where σM
x ′M Ψ⃗xM , which is the variance of the market portfolio.
Rearranging equation 11 , it follows that:

λM =

µM
2
σM

(10)

Thus, λM , the average level of risk aversion, identifies the units of excess return per
unit of market variance. Substituting the right-hand side of equation 12 for λM in equation
8 , and rearranging terms, yields the familiar CAPM equation for security expected excess
returns, but at the aggregate market level:
→
−
→
−
µ M = β M µM

(11)

where the vector of betas is the covariance of each security with the market portfolio
divided by the market variance
→
−
ΨxM
βM = 2
σM

(12)

The beta vector is subscript with M to make it clear that these are betas with respect
to the market average portfolio and not the betas that could be defined with respect to
each investor’s tangency portfolio.
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As discussed below, the equilibrium market values of the securities reflect the aggregation of the expected ending values across all investors. Expected excess returns, the
variances and covariances of returns are all inversely proportional to market values. In
the CAPM equilibrium, market values are such that equation 13 holds.

Formal Presentation of the PAPM with Heterogeneous Expectations
Moving to the PAPM, let
ρ

= the number of popularity characteristics

C = the n × ρ matrix of characteristics exposure of the securities
→
−
Φ i = the p-element vector of investor i’s allocations (portfolio weights) to the risky
securities
Investor i ’s problem is:
 − ′→
→
−
λi − ′
−
−
Ui →
max
xi = →
µ i−
x i + ϕ ′i C ′ →
xi − →
x Ψxi
−
→
2 i
xi

(13)

Relative to equation 1, equation 15 contains an additional term (middle term on the
right-hand side) that captures popularity characteristics and investor i ’s additional preferences. Investor i ’s preferences for different characteristics can be driven by expectations
around popularity premiums or non-return related preferences.
From the first-order condition, we have:
→
−
→
−
µ i = λi Ψxi − ϕ i

(14)



1
→
−
−
⃗i
x i = Ψ1 →
µ i + Cϕ
λi

(15)

The solution is:

Aggregating equation 17 across investors, we have the security weights of the market
portfolio:

1 −1 →
→
−
−
xM =
Ψ
µ M + Cπ
λM
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(16)

−
where →
µ M is as defined in equation 5 and
→
−
π = λM

m
X
−
wi →
ϕi
λi

(17)

i=1

→
−
π is the p-element vector of aggregate, wealth and risk aversion-weighted investor
preferences for different characteristics, and for reasons that will become apparent below,
we call ⃗π the vector of popularity premiums. Combining the matrix of security characteristics with the vector of popularity premiums, C⃗π leads to a n-element vector of
popularity-based adjustments that augment the market expected returns and impact the
market portfolio.
From equations 17 and 18, we derive an equation for the portfolio decision of each
investor relative to the market portfolio:
h
→
i

−
λM →
1
→
−
−
−
−
−
xi =
x M + Ψ−1 →
µi − →
µM + C ϕi − →
π
λi
λi

(18)

Hence, both differences in expected returns and differences in popularity preferences
impact individual portfolio construction.
−
Solving equation 18 for →
µ M yields:
→
−
µ M = λM Ψ⃗xM − C⃗π

(19)

−
Multiplying equation 21 through by →
x ′M yields:
−
−
2
µM = λM σM
−→
c M ′→
π

(20)

−
−
where →
c M = C ′→
x M , which is the vector of security characteristic exposures of the
market portfolio.
From equation 22 , it follows that:

λM =

µM + ⃗c′M ⃗π
2
σM

(21)

Substituting the right-hand side of equation 23 for λM in equation 21 , and rearranging
terms, yields the generalization of the CAPM equation for market average expected excess
returns:
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→

→
−
−−′
−
→
−
π
µ M = β µM + β →
cM −C →

(22)

In equation 24 the first term on the right-hand is the same as the right-hand side
of the CAPM. The second term represents the impact of popularity on security expected
returns. This equation looks like a multifactor asset pricing model, but with the popularity
premiums rather than risk premiums. For an individual security j, let

δjk = βj cM j − Cjk

(23)

so we can write:

µM j = β j µM +

p
X

δjk πj

(24)

k=1

We call δjk security j ’s popularity loading on characteristic k. It is positive if security
j ’s exposure to characteristic k is less than that of the beta-adjusted market portfolio and
negative if the reverse is true. In this way, a popularity loading of a security is positive for
a given characteristic if the security is unpopular with respect to the characteristic and
negative if it is popular.
As mentioned early, the PAPM can looks like APT, in which returns are a linear
function of factor/characteristic exposures. For the APT, the linear relationship between
expected return and premiums follows directly from the assumption that security returns
have a linear relationship to the risk factors. In contrast, in the CAPM and PAPM, the
linear structure of expected returns originates from the assumption that the utility derived
from the portfolio holdings is quadratic. For the PAPM, this is simplifying assumption
that could be dropped.
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